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1983.  However,  inflation  rates  remained  low  and  the  current  account 
continued to improve. Korea’s debt position also improved. Short-term debt, 
as a share of  total debt, declined from 26 percent in  1981 to  19 percent in 
1985, and the ratio of  debt service to exports dropped from 57 percent in 
1982 to 49 percent in 1985. 
The  government  initiated  further  depreciation  of  the  won  in  order  to 
bolster  Korea’s competitiveness. In  real  terms,  the  won  depreciated by  6 
percent during 1985 and by  an additional 15 percent in  1986. 
Nineteen  eighty-six was  a  banner  year  for  the  Korean  economy.  Real 
growth reached  12.5 percent, inflation remained at just 2.3 percent and the 
current account registered a $4.6 billion surplus (nearly 5 percent of GNP).’* 
In  stark contrast to  most  of  the other debtor countries which experienced 
further deterioration in their debt indicators,  l3 Korea’s debt to GNP ratio fell 
from 56.3 to 46.8 percent as its debt stock was reduced by  $2.25 billion. 
Strong growth in  the industrial countries,  lower interest rates,  a dramatic 
terms of  trade improvement (primarily from the drop in oil prices), and the 
substantial real depreciation all contributed to the impressive performance. 
Korea’s adjustment has been extremely successful on the macroeconomic 
stabilization front. The balance of payments, inflation, growth, and the debt 
burden  have  all  improved  dramatically since, 1979-81.  In  the  following 
chapters,  we  turn  from  a  chronological  analysis  to  an  examination  of 
individual pieces of  the performance. These pieces are synthesized and our 
main conclusions are summarized in the final chapter. 
5  Internal versus External Shocks 
AS described in chapter 4, Korea experienced large current account deficits, 
slowdowns  in  growth,  and  rapid  accumulation  of  external  debt  during 
1974-77  and again during 1979-83.  In both periods, the poor performance 
coincided  with  internal  as  well  as  external  developments.  This  chapter 
evaluates  the  relative  importance  of  internal  versus  external  factors  in 
explaining the current account imbalances during each of these periods. 
Our analysis draws from two approaches. The first begins with the current 
account identity and decomposes the change in  the current account from a 
base year into price, income, interest rate, and other effects. This approach 
does  not  take  into  account  shifts  in  behavior  of  domestic  residents 
(importers, monetary authorities, etc.). Our second decomposition, based on 
the  KDI  Quarterly  Macroeconomic  model,  incorporates  a  more  fully 
specified  set  of  behavioral  relationships.  The  basic  characteristics of  the 207  KoredChapter 5 
model are summarized at the end of this chapter. The model is described in 
more detail in W.  A. Park  (1986). 
5.1  Current Account Performance, 1974-77 
During 1972-73,  the average current account deficit was just 2.9 percent 
of  GNP.  In  1974  and  1975 this  figure jumped  to  10.8 percent  and  9.1 
percent, respectively (see table 4.2).  As discussed in chapter 4, internal as 
well as external developments seem to have contributed to the deterioration. 
On  the  external  side,  there  was  the  dramatic rise  in  oil  and  commodity 
prices. On the internal side, Korea was beginning the Big Push to develop 
HC  industries.  The  massive  investments called  for  increased  imports  of 
intermediates and capital goods. Thus, an interesting question is how much 
of the larger current account deficit can be attributed to the external terms of 
trade shock. 
In a very provocative analysis of this question, Y.  C. Park (198%) argues 
that the terms of  trade deterioration was not the most important factor. He 
finds that increased nonoil imports were almost twice as important. Because 
many of these imports are attributable to the Big Push, he concludes that the 
internal policy  shift significantly outweighed external factors in explaining 
the poor current account outcome. 
To support this view, Park decomposes the current account deterioration in 
each  year,  1974 to  1977, using  1972-73  as  a base.  His  components are 
world  interest rates,  import  and export  price changes,  import  and export 
volume  changes,  and  a  (domestic) aggregate demand  component.  Import 
price and volume are further decomposed into oil, capital goods, and other 
imports. His results are reproduced in table 5.1. He finds that 
the deterioration associated with the terms of  trade loss . . . amounted to 
an increase of  5 percentage points in the current account/potential GNP 
ratio . . . however, the sum of the expansion of capital goods in relation to 
fixed investment, and other imports, excluding oil, relative to GNP was 
the main element producing imbalance in the current account. This jump, 
equivalent to a deterioration of  10 percentage points, was larger than the 
actual  increase  in  the  deficit  ratio.  A  similar  development  took  place 
during 1975. (302) 
However, Park’s results overestimate the contribution of  increased nonoil 
import volume effects and underestimate the contribution of  external price 
developments. The difficulty arises from the price-volume decomposition of 
imports.  In  particular, Park’s analysis requires indices for unit value  and 
volume for capital goods and  “other”  imports on  a balance  of  payments 
basis. Proxies for these series are unreliable and potentially misleading. ’ 
To  make the point,  we  present an alternative decomposition. We  follow 
Park’s basic procedure, but divide imports into oil, nonoil goods, nonfactor 
services.2 This decomposition enables us to use a more reliable data series, 208  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 5.1  Current AccountIPotential GNP Ratio, 1974-77  (base period 1972-73) 
Item 
~~~  ~~  ~~ 
1974  1975  I976  1977 
I. Current account imbalances 
potential output (actual change) 






3. Interest rate effect 
4.  Accumulated debt effect 
5  Import replacement 
Capital goods 
Noncapital goods 
Oil conservation efforts 
6.  Export promotion 
Construction services 
7. Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
8. Total effect (2 to 7) 
9. Interaction effects and adding-up 
errors [(l)  through (8)] 
7.258  5.351 
4.893  4.284 
-0.462  -  1.573 
-  1.816  -  1.621 
3.064  3.302 
5.355  5.858 
0.167  0.458 
-  0.142  0.134 
9.528  7.621 
3.385  2.150 
6.358  6.312 
-0.215  0. I59 
-7.883  -7.791 
-0.031  -0.098 
1.183  1.123 
0.680  0.736 
0.503  0.387 
7.747  5.829 
-  1.710  -3.255 
-  0.489  -0.478 












-  15.932 









-  I I .495 
-  3.048 
2.608 















Source:  Y.  C. Park (198%.  table 11.8). 
Nore:  The  dccompositjon  factors  were  calculated  by  using  an  average  of  cument  ycar  and  base  period 
weights. A negative sign indicates a balance of  payments improvement. 
the  BOK’s unit value index for commodity imports. We  also use the Saudi 
Arabian petroleum price index reported  by  the IMF. 
The results are shown in table 5.2. Because we have used revised National 
Accounts data, we obtain a somewhat different base deficit to potential GNP 
(row  1).  However,  our primary  interest  is  in  the  share of  the  additional 
deficit attributable to terms of trade changes.  Using our decomposition,  it is 
clear  that  the  terms  of  trade  deterioration  is  the  predominant  factor 
explaining  the  1974-75  current  account  imbalance.  The  rise  in  oil  and 
commodity prices accounts for 90 percent of the imbalance in 1974 and over 
100 percent  of  the  imbalance  in  1975.  The impact  of  the  import volume 
changes is quite small in 1974 (6 percent contribution) and in fact contributes 
to an improvement in the  1975 current account equivalent to  14 percent  of 
the imbalance. 
To  further  investigate the  impact of the oil price rise  and other external 
shocks,  we turn  next  to the implications  of  the  KDI  Quarterly  Macroeco- 
nomic model. Unlike the simple decompositions reported  above, the model 
allows us to incorporate endogenous  changes in behavior,  e.g., changes in 
domestic prices,  output, and investment as a result of exogenous shocks. 209  KoredChapter 5 
Table 5.2  Current Account/Potential Nonagricultural GNP Ratio,  1974-77 
(base period 1972-73) 












Current account deficitlpotential 
nonagricultural GNP 
lmport Price 









Export promotion of goods and 
nonfactor services 
Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
Interest rate effect 
Accumulated debt effect 
Exports of factor services 
Net transfers 
Total effect (2 to 9) 
lnteraction effects and adding-up errors 
10.04  7.41 
7.01  10.05 
9.17  8.54 
5.46  5.67 
3.58  2.61 
0.13  0.26 
-  2.16  1.52 
0.64  -  1.07 
-0.41  -0.66 
0.81  -  1.56 
0.23  1.15 
-2.04  -4.07 
2.79  1.57 
2.76  1.74 
0.03  -0.17 
I .52  -0.45 
-0.93  0.06 
0.53  0.62 
0.41  0.58 
9.92  7.29 





































1  .oo 
0.28 




Source:  Authors’ calculations.  See text. 
Nore:  The  decomposition  factors  were  calculated  by  using  an  average  of  current year  and  base  period 
weights.  A negative sign indicates a balance of payments improvement. 
The model allows us to simulate the behavior of the current account under 
alternative  assumptions about  the  paths  of  exogenous variables.  We  then 
compare these counterfactual  paths with the actual performance. Of course, 
our simulations cannot tell  us what  policymakers  would  have done in  the 
absence of external shocks, or how the U.S. and Japanese economies might 
have performed differently. The exercises cannot fully disentangle the role of 
policy  adjustment  and  “luck,”  however,  they  do provide measures  of  the 
effect of  key external variables. 
We  begin with the following counterfactual  exercise (exercise A). Taking 
the  paths  of  other  exogenous  variables  as  given,  how  would  Korean 
economic performance  have been different from the actual experience if oil 
prices had  remained  fixed  at their 1972-73  average  level? The results  are 
reported in tables 5.3 and 5.4. In table 5.3 we examine the current account 
imbalance, providing a similar decomposition to that in table 5.2. For each 
year,  the  table  gives  the  estimated  outcome  and,  in  parenthesis,  the 
difference  between  the actual  and  the counterfactual  estimate.  Additional 210  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 5.3  Current Account/Potential Nonagricultural GNP with Fixed Oil Prices 
Item  1974  1975  1976  1977 
1. Current account deficitlpotential 
nonagricultural GNP 










4.  Export promotion of  goods and 
nonfactor services 
5. Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
6. Interest rate effect 
7. Accumulated debt effect 
8. Exports of factor services 
9.  Net transfers 
10.  Total effect (2 to 9) 




2.74 (- 6.43) 
-0.64  (-6.10) 
3.57 (-0.00) 
0.44 (2.60) 
-  1-10  (- 1.73) 
-0.22  (0.18) 
-  1.36 (-2.17) 
0.49 (0.25) 




-0.69  (-6.35) 
3.12 (0.51) 
4.04 (2.52) 
-4.00  (-2.93) 
-0.37  (0.30) 
-5.28  (-3.71) 
-0.22  (-0.48) 
1.64 (0.49) 


















-  1.38 (- 1.50)  -0.86  (-0.98) 
-6.05  (-3.76) 
6.08 (-4.09) 
-7.19  (-6.66) 
-1.07  (-5.95) 
-  5.44 (-0.17) 
-0.69  (-0.54) 
7.87 (2.57) 
1.29 (-1.40) 
-0.31  (0.18) 
-0.41  (-2.40) 
2.00 (0.82) 





-0.53  (-0.89) 
-0.31  (0.04) 
0.43 (0.05) 
-5.97  (-3.57) 
-0.08  (-0.18) 
-6.56  (-2.84) 
-2.44  (-4.29) 
-  13.10 ( -  7.07) 
-  1.29 (-5.66) 
-  10.76 (-0.74) 
-  1.06 (-0.67) 
10.66 (2.77) 
3.07 (-0.01) 
-0.30  (0.23) 
0.44 (- I .50) 
2.93 (I .26) 




2.84 (I .85) 
-1.61  (-1.89) 
-1.84(0.18) 
1.20 (0.06) 
-6.51  (-2.73) 
-0.05  (-0.11) 
Nore:  Using the KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model, the counterfactual  fixes oil prices at their (average) 1972-73 
level.  The decomposition  factors were calculated by  using  an average of  current year and base  period weights. A 
negative sign indicates a balance of payments improvement. Numbers in parentheses indicate the difference between 
the actual and counterfactual  values. 
Table 5.4 
Item  1974  1975  I976  1977 
Macroeconomic Performance: Fixed Oil  Prices versus Actual 
Real GNP growth  5.4  7.1  1.8  -2.0 
Real fixed investment (IF) growth  9.4  11.8  0.7  -5.9 
WPI inflation  -  13.6  -7.0  0.8  2.4 
CPI inflation  -  8.6  -5.0  1.3  2.0 
Exports  -0. I  0.3  0.7  0.7 
Imports  -0.8  -0.6  -0.5  -0.7 
Oil  -0.9  -1.0  -  1.3  -  1.5 
Nonoil  0.1  0.4  0.8  0.8 
Trade balance  0.7  0.9  1.2  I .4 
Exports of nonfactor services  -0.1  -0.0  -  0.0  -0.0 
Imports of  nonfactors services  0.0  0.  I  0.2  0.3 
Imports of factor services  0.0  0.1  0.  I  0.2 
Current balance  0.6  0.7  0.9  0.9 
Nore:  These figures are deviations between the baseline path and a counterfactual  in which oil prices are fixed 
at their (average)  1972-73  level.  The top panel  gives percentage deviations, while the bottom  panel  gives 
billions of U.S. dollars. The KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model is used for simulations. 211  KoredChapter 5 
comparisons of  the actual and  the counterfactual performance are given in 
table 5.4. The top panel of  that table shows the difference in GNP growth, 
investment growth, and inflation for each year. The bottom panel shows the 
absolute difference (in billions of  U.S.  dollars) for various components of 
the current account. 
The tables imply that the  1974 current account deficit would have  been 
only 60  percent as large as it actually was if  oil prices had been fixed. The 
improvement  amounts  to  $0.6  billion,  or  about  4  percent  of  potential 
nonagricultural GNP.  In contrast, the  simple accounting decomposition in 
table 5.2 estimates that the oil shock increased the current account deficit by 
5.5 percent of potential GNP. In fact, the accounting decomposition suggests 
a larger role for the oil price rise for every year during 1974-77  than  is 
suggested from the  model  simulations. The model estimates an impact of 
4.1, 3.8, and  2.8 percent of potential GNP during 1975, 1976, and  1977, 
respectively, as compared to 5.7, 4.9,  and 4.4 percent from the accounting 
decompositions. In the model the improvement from stronger terms of trade 
is partially offset by endogenous changes in  growth, inflation, investment, 
and other domestic variables. 
The key  factors explaining  the results  from the  model  are as follows. 
Lower oil prices would have led to lower domestic inflation and lower prices 
of  domestic exports. They would also have led to faster domestic growth, 
with  especially  strong effects on  domestic investment (table 5.4). These 
factors have conflicting effects on the external balance. A decline in  export 
prices decreases the dollar value of exports (holding export volumes fixed). 
This channel worsens the current account relative to the base by  2.6 percent 
of potential GNP. The lower oil prices would also have led to an increase in 
export volume, tending to improve the current account (table 5.3, row 4). 
The aggregate demand expansion is estimated to contribute an additional 3 
percent of  potential GNP to the  current account deficit. This is partially 
offset by  substitution effects from the decline in domestic prices on nonoil 
import demand (table 5.3, row 3). 
The  results  from  a  second  counterfactual  exercise  (exercise  B)  are 
reported in table 5.5. This exercise provides a rough measure of the overall 
impact from external shocks during 1974-77.  Here the world interest rate is 
assumed to be  fixed at its  1973 level. Oil prices, a weighted index of  real 
GNP of  Korea’s major trading partners,  and  a weighted index of  foreign 
prices are all assumed to increase at their three-year average rate of increase 
during 1970-73. 
We  compare the results in tables 5.4 and 5.5 so as to discuss the additional 
impact of external factors other than oil prices. The tables show that growth 
rates in  1974 would have been substantially higher under B than with just the 
fixed oil prices of  A. However, there is little difference in the inflation rates 
in  the  two  cases.  Furthermore, the current account improves by  only  an 
additional 17 percent. (Recall that the fixed oil price in A led to a 40 percent 212  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 5.5  Macroeconomic Performance: Fixed External Conditions versus Actual 
Item  I974  1975  1976  1977 
Real GNP growth  8.9  7.3  2. I  1.2 
Real fixed investment (IF) growth  14.7  11.7  0.2  -1 6 
WPI inflation  -  13.2  -4.4  3.9  3.4 






Exports of  nonfactor services 
Imports of  nonfactor services 
















0.  I 
0.  I 




















Nore:  These figures are deviations between  the  baseline  and  a  counterfactual  in  which  oil  prices,  foreign 
GNP.  and foreign  prices are assumed  to increase at the three-year  average  rate prior  to the oil shock. The 
world interest rate is assumed fixed at the preshock level. The KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model is used 
for simulations. Data in the top panel and percentages;  in the bottom panel, billions of  U.S. dollars. 
current  account  improvement  relative  to  the  actual  outcome.)  By  1975 
growth rates are nearly the same under the two scenarios, with B implying a 
somewhat  higher  inflation  and a  14 percent  current  account improvement 
relative  to  A. While the additional  external factors  had  a  relatively  small 
impact on the current account during 1974-75,  the simulations suggest that 
there would have been strong benefits by  1976 from an external environment 
in  which  there  was  continued  growth  by  Korea’s  trading  partners.  The 
simulations estimate substantial additional current account improvement in B 
compared to A during  1976-77 
5.2  Current Account Performance, 1979-83 
By  1977 the current  account had  improved  substantially  (see table 4.2). 
However, there was a renewed deterioration  during the 1979-81  economic 
crisis. Again, our discussion in chapter 4 identified both internal and external 
factors  which  contributed  to this  outcome.  External  factors  included  the 
second  oil  price  shock  as  well  as  increased  world  interest  rates  and  a 
slowdown in world growth. Internal factors  included the death of President 
Park,  the  associated  social  and  political  turmoil,  and  the  disastrous 
agricultural harvests. 
Again  we  begin  with  simple accounting  decompositions of  the  current 
account. We  present both  the decompositions  from Y. C. Park  (198%)  and 
our  revised  version.  The  revision  decomposes  imports  into  oil,  nonoil 
commodities, and nonfactor services instead of  oil, capital goods, and other 
imports.  As  before,  our  decomposition  enables  us  to  use  more  reliable 
import value deflators to separate changes in value from changes in volume. 213  KoredChapter 5 
In contrast to  the  1974-75  episode,  Park  concludes that  external price 
developments  were  the  most  important  cause  of  the  current  account 
deterioration after the second oil shock. As shown in table 5.6, he  finds that 
the  increased  prices  of  oil  and  capital goods  can  more  than  explain  the 
external  deficits.  The  terms  of  trade  effects  worsen  during  1981 before 
improving  somewhat  in  1982-83.  In  fact,  Park  finds  that  if  oil  prices, 
interest rates, and construction service exports had  remained at their  1978 
levels,  Korea  would  have  run  a substantial current account deficit during 
1979, a small deficit (less than  1 percent of potential output) during  1980, 
and surpluses during 1981-83. 
Our results  (table 5.7) also  point  to  the  critical role  of  terms of  trade 
changes,  particularly the  oil  price  rise,  in  explaining the  current account 
deterioration.  However,  our  decomposition  implies  a  smaller  role  for 
external price changes and a larger role, especially after 1981, for “import 
replacement” or the growing import volumes. 
Both  decompositions identify poor  export  performance as the  primary 
reason for the external imbalance in  1979. Both decompositions attribute the 
Table 5.6  Current Aceount/Potential GNP  Ratio, 1979-83 (base period 1977-78) 










Current account imbalances 
potential output (actual change) 






Interest rate effect 




Oil conservation efforts 
Export promotion 
Construction services 
Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
Total effect (2 to 7) 
Interaction effects and adding-up 
errors [(l)  through (8)] 
4.838 
-  1.581 
-  2.846 
-  1.507 
0.389 
-  1.728 
1.265 
0.586 







-  1.213 
0.228 











































1.675  0.607 
4.860  4.015 
3.719  3.142 
-0.139  0.216 
3.973  3.274 
1.141  0.873 
1.534  0.945 
0.653  0.886 
-0.114  -0.348 
-0.724  -0.842 
-0.246  0.061 
0.310  0.271 
-0.788  -1.174 
2.216  0.123 
0.986  1.674 
-7.012  -4.771 
-1.778  -0.981 
-5.234  -3.790 
1.527  0.455 
0.148  0. I52 
Source:  Y.  C. Park (1985~.  table  11.11) 
Nore:  The  decomposition  factors were  calculated by  using  an  average  of current  year  and  base  period 
weights.  A negative sign indicates a balance of payments improvement. 214  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 5.7  Current Accouut/Po&ential  Nonagricultural GNP Ratio, 1979-83 
Item  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983 
1.  Current account deficivpotential GNP 










4.  Expert promotion of goods and 
nonfactor services 
5.  Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
6.  Interest rate effect 
7.  Accumulated debt effect 
8. Exports of factor services 
9.  Net transfers 
10. Total effect (2 to 9) 


































-  6.38 
-4.69 







5.79  2.48  0.86 
6.48  4.36  3.41 
6.41  2.92  1.25 
5.03  5.01  3.88 
0.92  -2.45  -2.51 
0.47  0.36  -0.12 
0.07  I .44  2.16 
6.01  3.38  2.18 
0.11  -0.91  -1.40 
4.01  2.91  2.16 
1.89  1.38  1.42 
1.31  0.98  -1.20 
-10.16  -8.06  -4.83 
-7.97  -5.95  -3.47 
-2.18  -2.11  -1.37 
-0.71  -1.79  -3.18 
I .42  2.22  2.71 
I .oo  0.85  1.34 
0.21  0.26  0.  I6 
5.56  2.20  0.59 
0.23  0.28  0.27 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. See text 
Nore:  The  decomposition  factors  were  calculated  by  using  an  average  of  current  year  and  base  period 
weights. A negative sign indicates a balance of payments improvement. 
outcome in  1980 to the terms of  trade, poor export performance, and higher 
interest rates, partially offset by the drop in domestic aggregate demand. Our 
decomposition suggests that the terms of trade shock accounts for 74 percent 
of  the added  external imbalance, compared to over  100 percent  in  Park’s 
decomposition. Similarly, the nonoil commodity price deflator (which we 
feel to  be  more  reliable) does not  show the  same strong increase as the 
nonoil,  non-capital  goods  deflator  during  1981  -83.  Consequently,  our 
decomposition suggests that growing import volumes contributed nearly as 
much to 1981-83  current account deficits as did high import prices. 
It is interesting to compare the  1974-77  experience (table 5.2) with the 
1979-83  experience (table 5.7).  The  major difference is that  the  current 
account deficit was more persistent in the latter period. The current account 
imbalance was reversed two years after the onset of  large deficits in  1974, 
but only four to five years after the onset in 1979. 
Two factors help to explain this difference. First the terms of trade shock 
was  initially  larger but  less persistent in  the first episode.  Second,  strong 215  KoreaXhapter 5 
export performance during 1974-77  contributed to current account improve- 
ment. In contrast, export volumes contributed to the external deficits during 
1979-82.  Reasons for the poor export performance include the deterioration 
in  Korea’s external  competitiveness and  weak  world  demand.  However, 
these two factors were partially offset by the slow Korean growth (aggregate 
demand effect) and by  the deceleration in the growth of fixed investment as 
the economy pulled back from the Big Push during the early 1980s. 
Again,  we  use  the  KDI  Quarterly  Macroeconomic  model  to  further 
examine the impact of the oil price increases. Tables 5.8 and 5.9 present the 
results from a counterfactual simulation holding oil prices fixed at their 1978 
level (exercise A). As before, the figures in parentheses show the difference 
between the actual outcome and simulated value. 
Table 5.8 shows the importance of the oil price path very clearly. Holding 
oil prices fixed  would  have resulted  in  a  14 percent  improvement in  the 
current account as  a  percentage of  potential GNP in  1979, a  46  percent 
improvement in 1980, a 68 percent improvement in  1981, and small current 
account surpluses in  1982-83. 
As  before,  the  model  suggests a smaller role for the price of  oil when 
behavioral relationships are taken into account. The simulations imply that, 
as a  percentage of  potential GNP,  oil  price  changes accounted for  a  3.6 
percent current account deficit during  1980, and 4.0,  2.6, and  1.6 percent 
deficits during 1981, 1982, and  1983, respectively. The comparable figures 
from the accounting decompositions were 4.2, 5.0, 5.0, and  3.9 percent. 
The reasons for this difference are precisely the same during  1980-83  as 
they were during 1974-76.  Without the rise in  oil prices,  Korean growth 
would have been faster and investment would have been higher, tending to 
raise nonoil imports. 
Finally, we use the model to simulate the economic performance assuming 
an unchanged overall external environment (exercise B). Interest rates are 
fixed, while the average growth rates of oil prices, foreign GNP, and foreign 
prices are assumed equal to the average growth rates during 1976-78. 
Comparing the results from B (table 5.10) with those from A (table 5.9), 
and  those from the  1974-77  experiments,  it  is  clear that  nonoil  external 
factors  were  more  important  during  1979-82  than  1974-77.  Over  the 
1979-81  period, B implied an improvement in the current account deficit of 
34 percent more than A. The major reason for the improvement comes from 
the considerably stronger export  Performance that  can  occur when  world 
demand continues to grow. Stronger exports also contribute to more rapid 
domestic growth rates. 
5.3  The KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic Model 
We  would like to summarize here the key features of  the KDI Quarterly 
Macroeconomic model developed by  Won-Am Park. Additional information Table 5.8  Current AccounUPotential Nonagricultural GNP  with Fixed Oil Prices 
I. Current account deficitlpotential 
nonagricultural CNP 










4.  Export promotion of goods and 
nonfactor services 
5.  Aggregate demand adjustment 
Fixed investment 
Domestic output 
6. Interest rate effect 
7. Accumulated debt effect 
8. Exports of factor services 
9. Net transfers 
10. Total effect (2 to 9) 
I I. Interaction, adding-up, 
and simulation errors 
1979  1980  1981 
5.50 (-0.93) 
-  I .50 ( -  0.95) 
-3.84  (- 1.52) 
-  1.43 (- 1.55) 
-1.98  (0.14) 
-0.43  (-0.11) 
2.34 (0.57) 
0.37 (-0.12) 
-0.15  (0.05) 




-0.18  (0.14) 
1.32 (0.84) 





-  1.27 (- 1.52) 
4. I4 (- 3.57) 
2.42 (-3.29) 
0.08 (-5.37) 
-  1.35 (-5.59) 
1.71 (0.73) 




-  1.52 (- 1.84) 
1.58 (0.48) 
1.95 (-2.37) 
-3.00  (3.38) 
-2.31  (2.38) 




0.20 (- 0.02) 
4.65 (-2.83) 






-0.21  (-0.68) 
1.93 (1.86) 
3.73 ( -  2.08) 
-0.25  (-0.36) 
1.28 (-2.73) 
2.70 (0.82) 
-3.37  (-4.68) 
-3.28  (6.88) 
-3.07  (4.90) 
-0.21  (1.98) 
-0.09  (0.61) 
0.86 (-0.56) 




1982  1983 
-0.08  (-2.55) 
-0.49  (-4.85 
-4.15  (-7.08) 
-1.46(-6.47) 
-2.32  (0.13) 
-0.37  (-0.73) 
3.66 (2.23) 
3.27 (-0.11) 
-0.81  (0.10) 
1.34 (- 1.56) 
2.73 (1.36) 
-2.71  (-3.69) 
-2  17  (5.89) 
-  1.86 (4.08) 
-0.30  (1.81) 
-0.78  (1.00) 





-0.72  (- 1.58) 
-0.15  (-4.46) 
-5.74  (-6.99) 
-1.46  (-5.34) 
-3.26  (-0.75) 
-1.02  (-0.90) 
4.69 (2.53) 
3.99 (1.81) 
-  1.06 (0.34) 
1.71 (-0.45) 
3.34 (1.92) 
-  3.  I2 ( -  1.92) 
-  1.88 (2.95) 
-  1.50 (1.97) 
-0.38  (0.98) 
-1.93  (1.25) 
0.33 (- 2.38) 
1.50 (0.16) 
0.22 (0.06) 
-  1.95 (-2.54) 
1.23 (0.96) 
Nore:  Using the KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model, the counterfactual  fixes oil prices at their (average) 1977-78  level. The decomposition 
factos were  calculated by  using  an  average  of  current year  and base  period  weights. A  negative  sign  indicates  a  balance  of  payments 
improvement. Numbers in parentheses indicate the difference between the actual and counterfactual  values. 217  KoredChapter 5 
Table 5.9  Macroeconomic firformanee: Fixed Oil Prices versus Actual 
I979  1980  1981  1982 
Real GNP growth 








Exports of  nonfactor services 
Imports of nonfactor services 




-  2.7 
-  2.0 
6.4 
7.3 
-  13.0 



































1.7  - 
I-. r 








Nofe: These figures are deviations from the baseline path and a counterfactual  in which oil prices are fixed at 
their  (average) 1977-78  level. The top  panel  gives percentage  deviations,  while  the bottom  panel  gives 
billions of  U.S. dollars. The KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model is used for simulations. 
%ble  5.10  Counterfactual Analysis on External Shock 
1979  I980  1981  1982 
Real GNP growth  2.4  10.1  9.1  12.3 
WPI inflation  -2.5  -  13.7  -5.1  0.8 
CPI Inflation  -  1.8  -9.3  -2.8  2.5 






Exports of  nonfactor services 
Imports of nonfactor services 




-  0.6 
0.3 
0.5 
-  0.0 
0.0 
-  0.2 
0.7 
1.3 


























Nore:  These figures are deviations from the baseline  and a counterfactual  in which oil prices, foreign GNP, 
and foreign prices are assumed to increase at the three-year  average rate prior  to the oil shock. The world 
interest rate is assumed  fixed at the preshock  level.  The KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic model is used for 
simulations.  Data in the top panel are percentages;  in the bottom panel, billions of  U.S. dollars. 
about the model, including  the  actual equations and the estimation  results, 
are available on request. 
A major focus of the model  is to interrelate real and financial sectors of 
the  Korean  economy.  Thus,  the  model  incorporates  credit  availability  to 
firms for investment, includes money as a determinant of  consumption, and 
emphasizes links between the monetary sector and the balance of payments. 
The model  has been estimated  using quarterly data over 1972:I to 1985:IV. 
Seasonal dummies were included in the regressions  and, where appropriate, 218  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
the estimation was corrected for serial correlation. The model consists of six 
blocks  of  equations:  GNP,  government  sector,  labor  market,  wages  and 
prices, balance of payments,  and financial sector. 
Real  gross  national  expenditure  is  composed  of  private  consumption 
expenditure,  private  fixed  investment,  inventory  investment,  government 
expenditure,  exports and  imports of  commodities  and  nonfactor  services, 
and  net  factor  income  from abroad. Real  GNP is divided  into  two  com- 
ponents:  production  from agriculture,  forestry, and fisheries, and other pro- 
duction. 
The supply and demand for money are determined in  the financial block, 
where interest  rates in  the unorganized  money market  adjust to equilibrate 
the  market.  The  overall  balance  of  payments  and  the  government  budget 
deficit are both linked to the money supply. 
Prices are subject to both  demand-push  and  cost-pull  factors.  Wholesale 
prices  are determined by  firm’s production  costs.  The unit value  index for 
exports in  dollar  terms is  assumed  to be  influenced  by  world  demand  for 
Korean  exports  as  well  as  by  export  production  costs  (wages  and 
intermediate input costs). Import unit values are determined by the prices of 
capital goods imports and raw materials, including oil. The wage equation is 
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. 
Finally, the unemployment rate is determined by the gap between potential 
and actual output, a variant of Okun’s law. 
6  Introduction to Part Two 
Korea’s  macroeconomic  performance,  with  its  three  cycles  of  debt 
accumulation  and  recovery,  presents  a  number  of  puzzles  which  will  be 
examined  in  the remaining  chapters. Thus, in  summarizing  the  experience 
(particularly during 1979-85)  described in the first part of our study, we will 
introduce part 2 (ch. 7-12). 
The first puzzle is how Korea has managed to consistently maintain such 
high  growth rates.  Certainly  its rapid  growth  rates  for output  and  exports 
have helped to hold in check the burden of  external debt. A related  issue is 
how  Korea  was  able  to  achieve  a  substantial  improvement  in  the  current 
account  while  output  was  growing  strongly.  In  practice,  most  debtor 
countries have improved their current accounts through a domestic recession 
which  cuts  imports.  Improvement  with  growth  is  a  much  more  palatable 
option. 
Another  puzzle  arises  from  the  large  fluctuations  in  domestic  savings. 
How  was  Korea  able  to  increase  saving  rates  so  dramatically  from  the 